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CIVIL RIGHTS-FEDERAL REMEDIES:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, AS FEDERAL FLAGSHIP
FOR EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY, BALANCES RESPONSIBILITY
BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND VICTIM BY IMPOSING VICARIOUS
LIABILITY SUBJECT TO AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
FOR SUPERVISOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT CREATING
A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998)
I. FACTS
Kimberly Ellerth was employed in March 1993 by Burlington
Industries, Inc., initially as a merchandising assistant and later promoted
to sales representative.1 Fifteen months later, Ellerth resigned after being
repeatedly subjected to sexually inappropriate remarks and touches by a
supervisor, Theodore Slowik.2 Besides degrading and offensive com-
ments, 3 Slowik's statements on three occasions could be construed as
threats to deny Ellerth tangible employment benefits. 4
1. Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (Ellerth I). Burling-
ton is a textiles and home furnishings manufacturer with over 50 plants and more than 22,000
employees in eight divisions throughout the United States. Id.
2. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2262 (1998) (Ellerth IV). Ellerth's immedi-
ate supervisor reported to Theodore Slowik who was employed at the New York office of Burlington.
Ellerth 1, 912 F. Supp. at 1106. Although Ellerth worked in Chicago, Ellerth spoke to Slowik by phone
each week and interacted with him when he visited the Chicago office every month or two. Id.
Slowik was a mid-level manager whose decision making or policy making required approval from the
upper-level management hierarchy. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct, at 2262.
3. On one occasion Slowik and another employee walked by Ellerth, who was on the floor fold-
ing fabric samples, and Slowik said, "On your knees again, Kim?" Ellerth 1, 912 F. Supp. at 1108.
Ellerth considered his comment an offensive reference to fellatio. Id.
4. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2262. The first incident occurred when Ellerth was at a training
session with Slowik who invited her to the hotel lounge. Ellerth 1, 912 F. Supp. at 1107. Ellerth felt
compelled to accept the invitation because Slowik was her boss. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2262. After
Slowik commented that Ellerth's breasts were "a little lacking" and that she "ought to loosen up,"
Slowik then warned, "You know, Kim, I could make your life very hard or very easy at Burlington."
Ellerth 1, 912 F. Supp. at 1107.
The second incident occurred at Ellerth's promotion interview when Slowik voiced his hesitation
about promoting her because she was not "loose enough" and rubbed her knee during the interview.
Id. at 1108. Ellerth was promoted, but when Slowik informed her of the promotion, he added, "You're
gonna be out there with men who work in factories, and they certainly like women with pretty butts
[and] legs." Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2262.
The third incident occurred over the phone when Slowik parried Ellerth's request for permission
to place a customer's logo on a fabric sample: "I don't have time for you right now, Kim. . . . unless
you want to tell me what you're wearing." Id. When Ellerth repeated her request in a second phone
call, Slowik refused permission and stated something along these lines: "Are you wearing shorter
skirts yet, Kim, because it would make your job a whole heck of a lot easier." Id.
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Although Ellerth was given a copy of Burlington's employee hand-
book that contained a policy against sexual harassment,5 she chose not to
inform anyone in authority for fear of jeopardizing her job.6 In May
1994, Ellerth resigned after being cautioned by her immediate super-
visor for not promptly returning customer phone calls. 7 Subsequently,
Ellerth sought and received a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).8 In October 1994, Ellerth com-
menced a Title VII action, 9 claiming that Burlington was responsible for
supervisor Slowik's sexual harassment. 10
At trial, Burlington first argued that Slowik's harassing conduct was
not sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable."l However, recog-
nizing the threats to withhold tangible employment benefits imbedded in
Slowik's harassment, the district court was unpersuaded by Burlington's
first argument.12 The court determined that a reasonable jury could
easily find Slowik's conduct sufficiently severe and pervasive to create a
hostile work environment claim.13 Additionally, the court noted an over-
lap between quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims when
supervisors brandish work-related threats to employees, predicated on
submission to sexual conduct. 14
5. Ellerth 1, 912 F. Supp. at 1109. Burlington's policy manual stated: "The company will not
tolerate any form of sexual harassment.... If you have any questions or problems, or if you feel you
have been discriminated against, you are encouraged to talk to your supervisor or human resources
representative or use the grievance procedure promptly." Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 102 F.3d
848, 853 (7th Cir. 1996) (Ellerth II).
6. Ellerth 1, 912 F. Supp. at 1109. On one occasion Ellerth told Slowik that his sexual innuendos
were inappropriate. Id. However, Ellerth stated that she chose not to inform her immediate super-
visor because "it would be his duty as my supervisor to report any incidents of sexual harassment,"
which she feared would endanger her job. Id.
7. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2262. Initially, Ellerth did not mention sexual harassment as the reason
for her resignation, in either her faxed letter to her supervisor or in the message she left him on his
answering machine. Ellerth 1, 912 F. Supp. at 1109. Later, Ellerth wrote a follow-up letter essentially
stating she quit her job because of Slowik's harassment. Id.
8. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2263; see also Nichols v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 886
(8th Cir. 1998) (instructing that before bringing a civil suit, a Title Vl1 plaintiff must file a discrimina-
tion charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)).
9. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 infra Section IIA.
10. EllerthIV, 118 S. Ct. at 2263.
11. Ellerth , 912 F. Supp. at 1111.
12. Id. at 1115. Notwithstanding Ellerth's inability to recall the specifics of almost all Slowik's
offensive comments, the court found a triable issue of fact regarding sufficient severity of the threats.
Id. Further, the court rejected Burlington's minimizing of Slowik's conduct and had little problem
finding sufficient pervasiveness in weekly long distance phone calls with harassing remarks in every
single phone call. Id. Ellerth was required to see and speak to Slowik on a regular basis, due to
Burlington's management structure. Ellerth 11, 102 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 1996).
13. Ellerthl, 912 F. Supp. at 1114.
14. Id. at n. 10. Courts commonly distinguish between two types of sexual harassment: quid pro
quo and hostile work environment. Id. at 1110; see also discussion infra Section IIA. But cf. Ellerth
1I, 102 F.3d at 855 (reasoning that the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work environment
is analytic, and it would be a mistake to think that there is a bright line between the two); BARBARA
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, I EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 770 (3d ed. 1996) (observing that
[VOL. 75:87
1999] CASE COMMENT
Burlington further argued that as an employer, it was not liable
because Burlington did not know, or have reason to know, of Slowik's
conduct.15 The district court agreed and granted summary judgment to
Burlington because Ellerth never informed anyone in authority about
Slowik's sexual harassment. 16 The court rejected Ellerth's contention
that even without awareness of Slowik's conduct, Burlington should be
held strictly liable because of Slowik's threats to deny Ellerth tangible
job benefits if she did not comply with his demands.17
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
the district court's summary judgment,18 but then vacated and reheard
the case en banc. 19 Again reversing the summary judgment, the Seventh
Circuit produced eight separate opinions, some 200 pages, and no
consensus for a controlling rationale. 20 The fracture in the court epi-
centered on the appropriate standard of liability for employers whose
supervisors sexually harass employees. 2 1 The crux of the controversy
was whether agency principles called for a negligence or vicarious
liability standard when the supervisor's sexual harassment involved
unfulfilled threats of adverse employment actions. 22
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
sort out the governing agency principles to be applied in determining
employer liability for supervisor sexual harassment under Title VII.23 In
the line between quid pro quo and hostile work environment may be fuzzy).
15. Ellerth 1,912 F. Supp. at 1111.
16. Id. at 1117. Based on agency principles, the district court imposed a negligence standard
holding employers directly liable if they knew, or should have known, and failed to act on supervisors'
harassment outside the scope of their employment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219
(1958) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] infra Section liB.
17. Ellerth 1, 912 F. Supp. at 1123. The court concluded that although the quid pro quo element
(i.e., Slowik's threats to deny tangible job benefits) was substantial, the gravamen of Ellerth's com-
plaint was based on Slowik creating a hostile work environment. Id. at 1123. Thus, the court reasoned
that applying a quid pro quo standard of strict liability, rather than a hostile work environment standard
of negligence, would amount to "the tail wagging the dog." Id.
18. Ellerth 11, 102 F.3d at 863.
19. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (consolidat-
ing the Jansen and Ellerth appeals) (Ellerth 11I).
20. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2263 (1998). Circuit Judge Manion recognized the remote pos-
sibility of any reader, other than his colleagues, "finding this opinion buried amid 200 pages," but
nevertheless forged ahead. Ellerth II1, 123 F.3d at 557 (Manion, J., concurring and dissenting, joined
by Chief Judge Posner).
21. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2263.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2264. The Court also granted certiorari to another case to determine the circumstances
under which an employer may be liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment. Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2280 (1998) (Faragher III). Subsequently, the Court issued a joint
holding for both Faragher III and Ellerth IV. See Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. The issue of determin-
ing the appropriate standard of employer liability for supervisor sexual harassment was similar in both
cases, involving threatened changes in employment status of the victims who had not protested through
formal channels. See id. at 2262-63; Faragher 1I, 118 S. Ct. at 2280-81. However, the facts in
Faragher III presented a counterpoint to the facts in Ellerth IV. The sexual harassment in Ellerth IV
took place in the formal corporate setting, while the Faragher III scene involved a boisterous beach
atmosphere. See Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2262; Faragher III, 118 S. Ct. at 2280. Beth Ann Faragher
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a seven-to-two decision, the Court affirmed the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case
back to the United States Court of Appeals. 24 The Court held that em-
ployers are vicariously liable not only for tangible employment actions
taken against employees who refuse supervisors' unwelcome sexual
advances, but also for a hostile work environment created by super-
visors' threats and sexual harassment.25 However, if a supervisor did not
take a tangible employment action, the employer may raise an affirma-
tive defense showing that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and
promptly correct sexual harassment and that the victimized employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of these opportunities. 26
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Sexual harassment in the employment setting gives rise to a sex
discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,27 as
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.28 The courts and the EEOC
have interpreted Title VII by common-law agency principles, recogniz-
ing that these principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to
the statute. 29 Moreover, courts have not consistently applied uniform
standards of agency liability for employers whose supervisors sexually
harass their subordinates. 30
and other female lifeguards were subjected to their supervisors' propensity for uninvited touching of
various parts of the women's anatomies, including breasts and buttocks. Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1556-57 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (Faragher I). Disparaging comments were
repeatedly directed at the female lifeguards, such as, "If you had tits, I would do you in a minute." Id.
at 1557-58. Faragher was also threatened by her supervisor: "Date me or clean the toilets for a
year." Faragher III, 118 S. Ct. at 2280.
The factfinder noted that the beach setting and disproportionate ratio of male to female lifeguards
was conducive to a rambunctious camaraderie. Faragher 1, 864 F. Supp. at 1556. Nonetheless, the
trial court found the supervisors' conduct unwelcome, offensive, humiliating, as well as fairly frequent
and severe. Id. at 1561-62. Given the clear chain of supervisory command, the district court con-
cluded this supervisory conduct was sufficiently pervasive to infer that the city had constructive
knowledge of the harassment. Id. at 1563-64. Under agency principles, the court determined that the
supervisors were acting as agents of the city, so the court held the city directly liable for negligence in
failing to prevent the harassment. Id. at 1564. A deeply fragmented United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, sitting en banc. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530,
1534, 1534 n.3, 1538 (1997) (Faragher 11). Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to derive a manageable standard of employer liability for supervisors who perpetrate hostile
work environment sexual harassment. Faragher III, 118 S. Ct. at 2282.
24. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2271. The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, was joined
by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer. Id. at 2261. Justice Ginsberg con-
cuffed, and Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented. Id.
25. Id. at 2270. The Court defined a supervisor as having immediate or successively higher
authority over the employee. Id.
26. Id.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & West Supp. 1998).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). See generally, Penny Nathan Kahan, Sex Harassment Update,
SD06 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 757 (1998) (analyzing recent case law and issues in sexual harassment claims).
29. Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
30. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of
Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 71 (1995).
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A. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Title VII, Section 703(a), prohibits an employer from discriminat-
ing "against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individu-
al's . . . sex." 3 1 This prohibition against sex discrimination was the
product of an eleventh-hour political strategy, thus leaving a paucity of
legislative history to provide judicial guidance for interpreting sex
discrimination under Title VII.32 However, congressional intent to
vigorously combat sex discrimination became evident when the 1964
Act was amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.33
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court unequivocally included a
supervisor's sexual harassment, leading to either tangible or intangible
injury, within the ambit of Title VII's proscription of discrimination on
the basis of sex.34 Finally, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
supported sexual harassment law by allowing a right to jury trials and
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). Employment terms, conditions, or privileges include
hiring, firing, demoting, or promoting. Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for
Employment Discrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509, 524 (1996). However, the Supreme Court has
interpreted Title VII to cover not only "terms" and "conditions" in the narrow sense of an employment
contract, but all disparate treatment of female and male employees. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998). Furthermore, the statutory language of Title VII conveys the
intent of Congress to define employment discrimination in the broadest possible terms. Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). Congress deliberately chose not to enumerate specific
discriminatory practices, or elucidate all the parameters of these actions. Id. Because constant
change is the order of the day, Congress pursued the path of wisdom by being unconstrictive in
terminology. Id.
32. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 63-64 (1986). In an attempt to block Title VII, opponents
added discrimination based on sex at the last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives.
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964). Thus, no
legislative history was available for an eight-year period following the original enactment of Title VII.
Barnes, 561 F.2d at 987.
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & West Supp. 1998) (extending the same guarantees
against sex discrimination to government employees as those afforded to private employees). The
1972 Act provided in relevant part that "[aill personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for
employment ... in executive agencies ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex or national origin." § 2000e-16. In ringing tones, the House Committee on
Education and Labor reported that eight years after enactment, Title VII still left much to accomplish
to elevate the status of women in the workplace. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 987; H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 4-5
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2137.
34. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64. The EEOC has defined sexual harassment in violation of
Title VII as follows:
[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when 1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment; 2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or 3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a) (1997).
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big-money damages. 35 Two types of sexual harassment trigger Title
VII: quid pro quo and hostile working environment.36
1. Quid Pro Quo
Quid pro quo sexual harassment 37 is defined as conditioning
tangible employment benefits or detriments on sexual favors. 38 To state
a quid pro quo claim, an employee must establish a prima facie case.
39
Generally, the elements of a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual
harassment require showing: 1) membership in a protected class; 2)
subjection to unwelcome sexual harassment, such as sexual advances or
requests for sexual favors; 3) harassment on the basis of sex; and 4)
either submission to unwelcome advances as an express or implied
condition for receiving tangible employment benefits or refusal to
submit which resulted in a tangible employment detriment. 40
The first element to be proved in a quid pro quo sexual harassment
claim is membership in a protected class. 41 Congressional intent under-
lying Title VII targeted the entire spectrum of disparate treatment based
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994) (expanding the remedies available in Title VII cases by pro-
viding for compensatory and punitive damages, as well as damages for emotional distress). However,
punitive damages have a cap, depending on the number of the defendant's employees, ranging from
$50,000 for 100 or fewer employees to $300,000 for 500 or more employees. § 1981a(b)(3)(a)-(b);
but cf. Ellerth 1, 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1123 (N.D. 11. 1996) (remarking that despite the civil rights
legislation and the public consciousness-raising of events such the Hill-Thomas hearings, our nation's
workplaces are still filled with sexual harassment). Anita Hill testified that Clarence Thomas used
work situations to discuss sexual matters with her, including pornographic films and materials depicting
his own sexual prowess. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 36-37
(1993).
36. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65.
37. Professor Catharine MacKinnon introduced the term quid pro quo to sexual harassment analy-
sis in 1979. CATHARINE M AcKiNNON, S EXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING W OMEN: A CASE OF SEX D is-
CRIMINATION 32 (1979). Subsequently, MacKinnon's work was cited by the courts, which defined quid
pro quo discrimination as deprivation of a job benefit, which the employee was otherwise qualified to
receive, after the employee refused sexual advances. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909
(11 th Cir. 1982). Henson continues to be cited as the seminal case in quid pro quo sexual harassment
and as black letter law. Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 307, 310 (1998).
38. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 62.
39. In Henson, the court fashioned elements of a prima facie case for a quid pro quo sexual har-
assment claim from the McDonnell Douglas test. Henson, 682 F.2d at 911 n.22; see also McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 804 n.13 (1973) (ordering and allocating the burdens
of proof in employment discrimination cases by a factual showing of prima facie case elements).
40. Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1992). These prima facie case
elements may vary somewhat in different circuits. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773,
777 (2d Cir. 1994) (establishing a prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment when an employee
presents evidence of being subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct, and the employee's reaction
formed the basis for decisions affecting employment compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges).
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found these prima facie elements
particularly formalistic, overlapping, and unnecessary because, for example, all individuals-male or
female--belong to a protected class, and ordinarily sexual harassment is based on sex. Nichols v.
Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994).
41. Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 186.
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on sex in the workplace. 42 Thus, both genders are protected from sex
discrimination by Title VII's umbrella. 43 Consequently, this element of
a prima facie case only requires a simple stipulation that the employee is
either a man or a woman. 44
To fulfill the second element of a quid pro quo claim, employees
must show they have been subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment. 45
The harassment must be unwelcome in the sense that the employee
regarded it as undesirable or offensive; that is, the employee did not
incite or solicit the behavior. 46 Should an employee submit to sex with a
supervisor, however, the question for the court remains whether the
employee considered the sexual advances unwelcome, not whether the
sex was consensual. 47 If an employee once welcomed sexual behavior in
the workplace, but later decides the conduct is offensive, further advanc-
es become unwelcome if the employee makes that clear.4 8 Moreover,
employees' behavior during their non-work related private life is im-
material to whether they find workplace sexual advances unwelcome.4 9
42. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64 (citing Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.
1971))); 110 CONG. REC. 2728, 13,825 (1964).
43. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983).
44. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11 th Cir. 1982). Approximately nine of every
ten sexual harassment actions are brought by women. John Cloud, Harassed or Hazed? TIME, Mar.
16, 1998, at 55. Nonetheless, Title VII sexual harassment claims are available to men as well as
women. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 682. For example, a male restaurant manager was awarded
$237,257 when he was fired after declining his female supervisor's sexual advances. EEOC v.
Domino's Pizza, 909 F. Supp. 1529, 1538 (M.D. Fla. 1995); see also Steiner v. Showboat Operating
Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (allowing viable sexual harassment claims by employees of
both genders against the same supervisor). However, conflicting results may ensue when the sexual
harasser offends both female and male employees. Compare Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826
F. Supp. 1334, 1337-38 (D. Wyo. 1993) (finding that a supervisor's continuous desire to boast of his
sexual prowess was harassing to male employees, while graphic descriptions of sex acts he wanted to
perform with female employees were offensive to the females) with Johnson v. Tower Air, Inc., 149
F.R.D. 461, 469 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (dismissing a sexual harassment claim brought by a female flight
attendant, because the male manager's insulting and obscene remarks and gestures were unpleasant to
both male and female crew members).
45. Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 186.
46. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903; see also Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766 F. Supp. 1052,
1077 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (indicating the police department apparently did not understand that the issue is
whether females reasonably considered physical touching by male officers as unwelcome, not
whether male officers viewed the touching as friendly).
47. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986). The fact that the employee was
not forced to participate is, therefore, not a defense. Id. Rather, the trier of fact determines whether
a particular conduct was indeed unwelcome, and the question turns largely on credibility. Id. •
48. Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (characterizing as unwelcome har-
assment the sexual remarks and continued touching at work of an ex-lover after their affair ended).
In so-called "soured romance" cases, unwelcomeness is particularly difficult to determine because
"the adverse job action may stem from a personal reaction to the individual involved in the former
romance and not involve harassment based on gender." EEOC Policy Guide on Sexual Harassment,
reprinted in 421 FEP MANUAL 459 (1998). Therefore, the EEOC recommends clearly notifying a
harasser, as well as the employer or the EEOC, that conduct is no longer welcomed. Id.
49. Bums v. McGregor Electronic Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1993). In Burns, female
employee had posed nude for a magazine. Id. at 961. Reprimanding the trial court for its decision that
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Participating in offensive conduct, such as foul language, also does not
indicate the comments were generally welcomed.50
Proving the third element of a quid pro quo case requires a showing
of harassment on the basis of sex. 51  Employees must be intentionally
singled out for adverse treatment because of their sex.52 Thus, to prove a
claim for sexual harassment, employees must show they would not be
objects of harassment "but for" the fact of their gender. 53 Harassing
conduct may be motivated by sexual desire, 54 consisting of sexual
advances or behavior with clear sexual overtones. 55 But conduct of a
nonsexual nature may constitute prohibited sexual harassment as well,
for example, humiliating 56 or ridiculing employees based on their sex, or
treating employees of one sex as inferior to the other.57 Similarly,
same-sex harassment on the basis of homosexual desire is not the only
factor in determining whether a victim has been targeted because of
gender. 58 Rather, harassment by sex-specific and derogatory terms may
the employee found sexual advances at work unwelcome but not offensive because of her magazine
photographs, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Id. at 966. The court
emphasized that no matter how reprehensible an employee's private life may be, her past did not
mean she acquiesced to unwanted sexual advances at work. Id. at 963; see also Stacks v. South-
western Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1327 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding sexual advances at work
unwelcome, although the female employee was having a private consensual affair with another
married employee).
50. Swentek, 830 F.2d at 557 (warning that consensual foul language or sexual innuendo does not
waive employees' legal protections against unwelcome sexual harassment). Compare Carr v. Allison
Gas Turbine, 32 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 1994) (ruling that an employee's bawdy behavior and foul
language neither justified nor indicated that she welcomed four years of extensive derogatory and
sexual comments, pranks, graffiti, and pictures) and Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568,
571 (8th Cir. 1997) (determining that a victim's crude language and "tomfoolery" did not show that
harassing conduct was welcome) with Balletti v. Sun-Sentinel Co., 890 F. Supp. 1539, 1541 (S.D. Fla.
1995) (viewing exchanged vulgarities between employees, including attempts by a female employee
to pull down a male's pants that resulted in exposing his buttocks, as indicative that she welcomed such
behavior) and Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding the plaintiff failed to
prove unwelcomeness because she was put on probation for offensive language, received instructions
to stop wearing a T-shirt with no bra, gave sexually suggestive gifts to male employees, and showed
male supervisors her hysterectomy scars which revealed her pubic area).
51. Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1992).
52. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11 th Cir. 1982).
53. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 548 (1971). The question in "but-for" causa-
tion is whether the employee would have suffered the harassment if he or she had been of a different
gender. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d
934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (describing "but for" causation in sexual harassment claims). Title VII
requires showing discrimination "because of' gender; so the employee must be disadvantaged,
compared to others, by behavior that alters conditions of employment because it is so objectively
offensive. David G. Savage, Signs of Disagreement, A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 50.
54. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).
55. Bell v. Crakin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985).
56. See, e.g., Faragher I, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1557 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (calling women employees
"b -..... and asking a woman lifeguard if she was going to "f---" all the male lifeguards, just like the
other female lifeguards).
57. See, e.g., Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766 F. Supp. 1052, 1073 (M.D. Ala. 1990)
(blaming a female police officer for an attempted escape and referring to her as the "weak link,"
even though the blame lay squarely on the shoulders of a male officer who failed to follow proper
procedures).
58. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002. Victims of same-sex harassment are also included in Title VII
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indicate that the harasser is motivated by general hostility, not sexual
desire. 59 The critical issue is whether members of one gender are
exposed to employment terms or conditions which are disadvantageous,
while members of the other sex are not so exposed.60
The fourth element of a quid pro quo claim is the employee's sub-
mission or refusal to submit to a supervisor's unwelcome advances, result-
ing in a tangible employment consequence. 6 1 The gravamen of a quid
pro quo claim is the conditioning of tangible job benefits or privileges
on an employee's submission to sexual blackmail.62 Two types of quid
pro quo cases may be distinguished: refusal and submission. 63
In a typical refusal case, an employee who rebuffs a supervisor's
sexual advances can expect to suffer some reprisal at work. 64 Thus, an
employee can prove quid pro quo harassment by evidence of some job-
related penalty. 65 However, in a submission case, evidence of economic
harm may be unavailable if the employee submits to a supervisor's
sexual advances. 66 Thus, the employee's continued employment, raises,
work assignments, or promotions may all depend on continued respon-
siveness to a supervisor's sexual demands. 67 Therefore, evidence of an
adverse employment action will not always be available; but it is enough
to show that the supervisor used the employee's submission to make
decisions affecting terms, conditions, or privileges of the job.68
prohibitions against sex discrimination. Id. at 1001-02. In Oncale, a male roustabout on an eight-man
oil rig crew was forcibly subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions. Id. at 1001. The supervisors
and co-workers constantly picked on Oncale, suggesting that he was a homosexual. Id. Among other
harassing incidents, a male co-worker held Oncale down in a shower and shoved a bar of soap into his
anus, threatening rape. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir.
1996).
59. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
60. Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
But see Marley S. Weiss, The Supreme Court 1997-1998 Labor and Employment Law Term (Part I):
The Sexual Harassment Decisions, 14(2) THE LABOR LAWYER 261, 270 (1998) (suggesting that the On-
cale reasoning will provide a new impetus for defense strategies which contend that indiscriminate sex-
ual harassment directed at all employees is equivalently objectionable, hence nondiscriminatory); cf.
Savage, supra note 53, at 51 (quoting employment law experts as stating that the Oncale decision ex-
panded the coverage to both genders, but restricted the liability by insisting on proof of actual job dis-
crimination because of sex). "[T]his may be the opening salvo of a campaign to rein in the law." Id.
61. Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178,186 (6th Cir. 1992); see also 29 C.F.R. §
1604.1 l(a)(1)(2) (1997) (defining quid pro quo sexual harassment as "submission to or rejection of
[unwelcome sexual] conduct by an individual ... used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual").
62. Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989).
63. Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1993).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The court did not read Title VII as punishing victims of sexual harassment who sur-
rendered to unwelcome sexual encounters because then harassers would be encouraged to increase
their persistence. Id. Moreover, requiring an actual economic loss for employees who submit to a
supervisor's unwelcome sexual overtures unduly emphasizes the victim's reaction, when the focus
should be on the prohibited behavior. Id. at 779.
67. Id. at 778.
68. Id. But see infra note 190 (questioning whether submission cases will be actionable as quid
19991
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Ultimately, once an employee has established a prima facie case for
quid pro quo harassment, liability hinges on whether there is a causal
connection between the alleged harassment and the tangible employment
act. 69 Tangible employment actions include materially adverse changes
in the terms and conditions of employment, such as termination of em-
ployment or demotion accompanied by a decrease in compensation. 70
Other job detriments, such as reassignments, must cause a materially
significant disadvantage involving diminution in title, responsibilities, or
benefits. 71 Thus, employment changes with less potential for advance-
ment, as well as less attractive and fewer duties, are not tangible job
detriments unless there is an actual pecuniary loss or change in job
classification.72 Furthermore, employee claims of being discouraged
from applying for more attractive jobs must be supported by identifying
specific jobs for which the employee has applied.7 3
Negative changes in public perception of the employee's job trans-
fer are insufficient to constitute a material employment disadvantage.74
pro quo sexual harassment after the Ellerth IV decision); Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998)
(requiring a tangible employment detriment to impose automatic vicarious liability on employers).
69. Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 473 (8th Cir. 1995). Compare Nichols v. Frank,
42 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding a close connection between a supervisor's approval of an
employee's request for a leave of absence and the supervisor's demand for oral sex, because the
supervisor immediately approved the employee's request following her submission to his demand) with
Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (concluding then Governor Clinton's alleged
reference to being a good friend of Paula Jones' supervisor, accompanied by sexual touching and a
request for oral sex, was not a sufficient causal link); see also Cram, 49 F.3d at 474 (determining that a
harasser's statement, "I'll get you for this," established an insufficient causal nexus to show
enforcement of a quid pro quo demand because there was no reference to the employee's job);
Hartleip v. McNeilab, Inc., 83 F.3d 767, 775-76 (6th Cir. 1996) (ruling that a harasser's statement that
he was "close friends" with an individual who had impact on a claimed adverse employment decision
as too attenuated to establish causation).
70. Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993).
71. Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994); cf Crady, 993 F.2d at
136 (stating that mere inconvenience or an alteration of job duties is not sufficiently disruptive to
qualify as a materially adverse employment action); Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 673-74 (indicating that,
without more, de minimis personnel matters are insufficient to constitute a tangible job detriment;
Harlston, 37 F.3d at 382 (finding no significant material disadvantage when an employee's reassign-
ment involved fewer duties and more stress, such as the need to watch the door, listen for the fax, and
monitor people coming and going).
72. Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 672. For example, job transfers are not adverse employment actions
unless they involve a demotion in form or substance or major changes in working conditions and
reduction in pay or benefits. Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996).
Even requiring an employee to move to another town, which the employee found unpalatable, did not
rise to the level of an adverse employment action because the position, title, and salary remained
unchanged. Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997). Courts also have
required employees transferred to new positions to "give it a try" and not speculate that their employer
was acting in bad faith, for purposes of comparing claimed adverse employment changes. Damell v.
Campbell County Fiscal Ct., 924 F.2d 1057, 1065 (6th Cir. 1991); accord Kocsis v. Multi-Care
Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 887 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting the failure of an employee to make a real
attempt at comparing the two employment positions before filing a claim).
73. Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 671. Tangible employment detriments must be sufficient to create a
genuine issue of fact, not mere inferences based on generalized speculation or conjecture. Splunge v.
Shoney's, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1258, 1271 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
74. Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 1989). In Spring, a school
principal argued that her transfer and reassignment to a dual principalship was a public humiliation,
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A bruised ego and a semantic change in title are also insufficient
tangible job detriments when pay and benefits remain the same after a
lateral transfer. 75 Nor are general allegations of hostility and personal
animus sufficient to constitute a materially adverse employment action,
without evidence of a tangible change in duties or working conditions. 76
Patterns of negative or adverse employment actions, such as supervisor
criticism and low proficiency ratings, also are insufficient to prove a
tangible job detriment without financial harm, suspension, or termination
of the employee.77
To summarize, a quid pro quo claim requires a showing that an
employee was subjected to harassment on the basis of sex, as a condition
of tangible employment actions. 78 The harassing conduct may be either
sexual in nature or degrading and humiliating, but the behavior must be
unwelcome. 79 Finally, a causal connection must sufficiently link the
harassment and the tangible employment decision detrimentally affect-
ing the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment. 80
2. Hostile Work Environment
Creating a hostile work environment, without causing tangible or
economic loss, is also actionable under Title VII.81 In Meritor Savings
Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, the United States Supreme Court for the first
time recognized an actionable Title VII claim based on sexual
harassment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to create an
abusive work environment. 82 A hostile work environment claim is
perceived as a "nudge toward retirement." Id. at 885-86. However, the court termed her argument
as "not strong stuff' because the only material disadvantage to the new position was further distance
from home to school, for which she was reimbursed. Id. at 886.
75. Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 456 (7th Cir. 1994).
76. Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 673.
77. Hicks v. Brown, 929 F. Supp. 1184, 1190 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
78. Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1992).
79. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998).
80. Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 670.
81. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986). Recognizing the significant
relationship between employees and their working environment and that discrimination may be
evinced more subtly than by isolated events such as hiring, firing, and promoting, the court interpreted
Title VII to include protection from psychological abuse in the workplace. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). In Rogers, the court protected employees from a work environment so
heavily charged or "polluted" with race discrimination as to alter the emotional or psychological terms
and conditions of employment. Id. Subsequently, the court extended the availability of hostile work
environment claims to sexual harassment as well, finding such conduct "poisoned" the employment
atmosphere. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981). "Surely, a requirement that a man
or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make
a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets." Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d, 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982).
82. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67. A prima facie case for hostile work environment sexual
harassment is made out by elements similar to the quid pro quo prima facie case: 1) that the victim
belonged to a protected group; 2) that the victim was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; 3)
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assessed by considering the totality of the circumstances, such as the
frequency, severity, and nature of the conduct, as well as the conduct's
unreasonable interference with work performance. 83 While none of
these circumstances is required, 84 all evidence of abusiveness of the
employee's working conditions is relevant to the inquiry. 85 Thus,
psychological harm is relevant, but not required, and will be considered
along with any other relevant factor. 86 The whole context of workplace
interrelationships between the key players, the harasser and the victim,
must be assessed.87
The sexually harassing behavior must be subjectively and
objectively severe or pervasive such that both the employee and a
reasonable person would find it sufficient to create a hostile work
environment. 88 Subjectively, the employee must in fact perceive the
workplace as offensively abusive. 89 Objectively, the court must consider
whether a reasonable person would perceive the sexual harassment as
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile or abusive work
environment. 90 Several courts have modified the reasonable person
standard to focus on the perspective of the victim.91
that the victim was harassed on the basis of sex; 4) that the harassment affected a term, condition, or
privilege of employment by a supervisor's harassment which is sufficiently severe and pervasive to
create a hostile work environment; and 5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment
and failed to take prompt remedial action. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-04.
83. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). The nature of the conduct is assessed by
evaluating whether the behavior is physically threatening, humiliating, or merely an offensive
utterance. Id. Furthermore, the employee need not prove a tangible decline in productivity, only that
the job became more difficult to perform because the harassment altered working conditions. Id. at 25
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 23. "This is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test." Id. at 22.
85. Nichols v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 887 (8th Cir. 1998).
86. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
87. Nichols, 154 F.3d at 887; see also Faragher Ill, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998) (determining
whether an environment is hostile or abusive by looking at all the circumstances).
88. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; see also Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1272 (7th Cir.
1991) (stating that subjective and objective standards allow the trier of fact to "keep an eye on the
ball" more easily than the multi-factor prima facie test for hostile work environment).
89. Faragher 11, 118 S. Ct. at 2283. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
found an employee subjectively did not view the atmosphere at the office as abusive when she
exchanged off-color stories with the staff members and never complained about the work
environment. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir. 1993). This office atmosphere
included unusually rough, raw, and sexually explicit remarks that the entire staff tolerated. Id.
90. McKenzie v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996). The objective
standard places a check on claims filed by supersensitive "eggshell" employees. Daniels, 937 F.2d at
1271. The real social impact of workplace conduct depends on a constellation of surrounding
circumstances, expectations, and relationships not fully captured by simply reciting the acts performed
or words spoken. Id. Thus, the inquiry requires common sense, careful consideration, and sensitivity
to the social context where the harassing occurs and is experienced by the target victim, in order that
ordinary socializing is not mistaken for discrimination. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998).
91. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit instituted a reasonable victim
standard, focusing on the perspective of either a female or male victim. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d
872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). The rationale is that the same behavior which women may find objection-
able, men may not find offensive at all. Id. at 879-80. Because women are disproportionately victims
of rape, they may understandably worry that the sexual harassment will lead to violent sexual assault.
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Harassing conduct must be sufficiently severe to establish an
actionable sexually objectionable environment.92 However, the United
States Supreme Court has taken a middle path between making action-
able any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the sexual harass-
ment to cause a tangible psychological injury. 93  The abusive work
environment does not have to seriously affect the employee's psycho-
logical well-being to alter employment conditions, because less serious
effects can detract from job performance, discourage the employee from
remaining on the job, or prevent career advancement.9 4 That is, Title VII
comes into play before the sexual harassment produces a nervous
breakdown .95
However, mere discriminatory utterances or epithets that offend
feelings are not actionable. 96 Rather, the workplace must be riddled with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult so as to alter employ-
ment terms and conditions. 97 Thus, workplace harassment is not auto-
matically discriminatory when words are merely tinged with sexual con-
tent or connotations. 98 Appropriate sensitivity to the social context must
Id. at 878. Believing a sex-blind standard tends to be male-biased and ignores women's experiences,
the court adopted a reasonable woman standard for women victims. Id. at 879. Conversely, for male
victims of sexual harassment the court preferred a reasonable man standard. Id. at n. 11; see also
Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 603 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993) (assessing sexual harassment
hostile work environment claims by a reasonable woman standard); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,
895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990) (requiring the trial court to examine whether conduct was hostile
and offensive to a woman of reasonable sensibilities); Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d
959, 965 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying the reasonable woman standard to determine whether conduct was
unwelcome); Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 447 (3d Cir. 1994) (utilizing the reasonable person of the
same sex test).
However, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the reasonable woman standard, preferring the
perspective of the reasonable person because it was carefully crafted with sufficient flexibility to
incorporate gender differences. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 166 (Mich. 1993). Fearing
fragmentation of legal standards, as well as a retrenchment of sexist attitudes, the court indicated the
law can have no favorites. Id. at 166-67. Stereotypes that women are sensitive, fragile, and need a
more protective standard perpetuate paternalism. Id. Furthermore, in both Oncale and Faragher 111,
the United States Supreme Court confirmed the reasonable person standard previously laid out in
Harris. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003; Faragher II1, 118 S. Ct. at 2283; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
92. Faragher II1, 118 S. Ct. at 2283.
93. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
94. Id. at 371.
95. Id. Even without tangible effects, Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality is offended
by creating a hostile work environment abusive to employees because of their gender. Id.
96. Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
97. Id. Title VII is not designed to purge the work environment of vulgarity, but rather to protect
employees from harassment making the workplace "hellish." Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d
428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995). Chief Judge Posner discussed the continuum: assaults, physical contact or
solicitations, and intimidating or obscene gestures, words, or pictures juxtaposed to occasional vulgar
banter by boorish workers. Id. Upsetting a jury verdict of $25,000 for the plaintiff, Chief Judge
Posner stated that the supervisor never said anything to Baskerville that could not be repeated on
prime-time television. Id. at 431.
98. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998). In Oncale, Justice
Scalia downplayed the arguable risk of transforming Title VII into a "general civility code for the
American workplace." Id. Title VII does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in male-
female interactions. Id. at 1002-03; see also Ellerth III, 123 F.3d 490, 540 (7th Cir. 1997) (Coffey, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (citing Vincent J. Schodolski, Harassment Suits Curb Workplace Free
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be given careful consideration, so discriminatory conduct is not mistaken
for ordinary socializing, such as intersexual flirtation or male-on-male
horseplay. 99
Harassing conduct must also be sufficiently pervasive to establish an
actionable sexually objectionable environment. 100 Isolated and innocu-
ous incidents are insufficient to demonstrate a hostile work environment
claim, 101 because Title VII is directed at discrimination in employment
conditions and not mere unpleasantness. 102 However, a hostile work en-
vironment is not demonstrated by alleging a "magic" threshold number
of incidents. 103 The conduct must be sufficiently extreme to amount to
a change in employment terms and conditions.104 Thus, the criteria of
severe and pervasive will filter out complaints of occasional teasing or
sporadic use of abusive language or gender-related jokes as ordinary
tribulations of the workplace.105
In this conflicting and often overlapping tangle of what constitutes
severe and pervasive,106 one clear theme emerges: criminal conduct of
the most serious nature is plainly sufficient to state a hostile environment
claim.107 Thus, a single incident of a supervisor's sexual assault suffi-
ciently alters the victim's employment conditions and allows a claim to
be actionable.108 However, a single incident of exposing genitals to a
Speech, CHI. TRIB., June 23, 1997, at 1) (lamenting the transformation of the workplace into a
"nervous nest," where employees are afraid to express honest emotions or say what they think
because of constantly shifting legal rulings).
99. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003. Justice Scalia's example became instantly famous. Savage, supra
note 53, at 50. The example compared a coach smacking his professional football player's buttocks,
as he headed for the field, with the same behavior toward his secretary at the office. Oncale, 118 S.
Ct. at 1003. On the one hand, the behavior is innocuous; but on the other, it could reasonably be
perceived as abusive. Id. The Court urged the use of common sense in distinguishing between
severely abusive conduct and same-sex roughhousing or simple teasing. Id.
100. Faragher III, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2284 (1998).
101. Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1456 (7th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that a handful
of comments spread out over months will have less emotional impact than an incessant barrage of
comments).
102. Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1994).
103. Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Saxton v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993) (recounting "relatively limited" instances
of supervisor harassment which included placement of a hand on the employee's leg above the knee,
rubbing her upper thigh, kissing her several seconds, and lurching at her from behind bushes).
Compare Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding no
sustained or serious grounds to create an issue of material fact when a supervisor repeatedly asked an
employee for dates, called her a "dumb blonde," put his hand on her shoulder, tried to kiss her, and
left love notes in her work area) with Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir.
1993) (raising an issue of material fact when a doctor repeatedly swore at female nurses, called them
abusive names, threatened and occasionally physically harmed them).
104. Faragher IlI, 118 S. Ct. at 2284.
105. Id. (citing BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT
LAW 175 (1992)).
106. Id.; see also John Cloud, Sex and the Law, TIME, Mar. 23, 1998, at 49 (stating that sexual
harassment litigation hinges on terms like unwelcome and pervasive, "words that a thousand lawyers
can define in a thousand ways").
107. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
108. Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995); accord King v. Board of Regents,
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subordinate and requesting oral sex were not deemed sufficient to state a
claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment. 109
To summarize, a hostile work environment claim requires sufficient-
ly severe or pervasive sexual harassment so as to create an abusive work-
place by altering employment terms or conditions.lO Under the totality
of the circumstances test, the frequency, severity, and nature of the
sexual harassment are assessed, as well as interference with work per-
formance."'l Subjective and objective perceptions of the supervisor's
conduct are relevant to determining whether the harassing behavior is
sufficiently severe and pervasive.112
B. EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER AGENCY PRINCIPLES
Title VII expressly provides for employer liability for sexual harass-
ment of employees"l 3 and defines "employer" to include "agent."114
Moreover, because employment discrimination is a complex and
pervasive problem, Congress reasoned that it could be extirpated only
with thoroughgoing, unrelenting, broad-scale remedies.11 5 To that end,
the United States Supreme Court commanded the lower courts to "look
to agency principles" for guidance in determining the standard of
employer liability in sexual harassment cases."l 6 The Restatement
898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging that a single act of sexual harassment may be
sufficient to state a Title VII hostile work environment claim); Crisonino v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (indicating a single incident of assault sufficient for
hostile work environment sexual harassment, when a supervisor called an employee a "dumb b----,"
gave her a hard shove so she fell backward, and caused injury as she hit the floor); Johns v.
Harborage I, Ltd., 585 N.W.2d 853, 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (finding a single incident sufficiently
severe to state a claim, when a male lured the victim into a storage closet, exposed himself, and then
forcibly pulled down the victim's pants).
109. Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 675 (E.D. Ark. 1998). Paula Jones alleged that then-
Governor Clinton dropped his pants to expose his erect penis and told her to "kiss it." Id. at 664. The
district court determined that this conduct, although boorish and offensive, did not constitute sexual
assault. Id. at 675. Subsequently, Ms. Jones appealed the district court's decision. Jones v. Clinton,
138 F.3d 758 (1998). However, the parties reached a $850,000 settlement, ending the sexual harass-
ment suit filed against President Clinton in 1993. John King, Jones to Get Her Money from Clinton
(visited Jan. 12, 1999) <http://www.CNN.com>.
110. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
111. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
112. Faragher 11, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
114. Id. § 2000e(b). "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person." Id.
Unfortunately, Title VII does not specifically define "agent". Sauers v. Salt Lake County, I F.3d
1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993). But cf., White, supra note 31, at n.6. (stating that for purposes of Title
VII, courts have deemed employees to be agents if they participated in the decision-making process).
115. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 69 (1984); see also H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 8, 14
(1971); S. REP. No. 92-415, at 5 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2149.
116. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). Agency is the fiduciary rela-
tionship resulting from consent by a person to act on behalf of and under the control of another person.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, at § 1.
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(Second) of Agency, governing the master-servant relationship,1 17
embodies the general rules defining when an employer is liable for
supervisor actions. 1
18
1. Scope of Employment
The master-servant relationship may result in an employer's vicari-
ous liability 119 for wrongful acts of its employees, under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.120 But agency law also governs the liability of the
employer for failing to fulfill its special duty to protect employees.121
The rationale provided by the Restatement is that the law should hold
employers liable for delegating authority to their employees to act on
behalf of the employer.12 2 Reasonably, an employer can anticipate or
117. A master-servant relationship is a form of agency where the master employs the servant as
an agent to perform the master's affairs, and the master controls the conduct of the servant or agent
while performing those services. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, at § 2. But see HAROLD GILL
REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 48-50, at 99-104 (1979)
(distinguishing principal-agent relationships from master-servant relationships). A principal-agent
relationship is a contractual relationship; whereas, a master-servant relationship is an employment
relationship. Id. However, in analyzing respondeat superior liability, courts may confuse the two and
use contract principles of agency. Oppenheimer, supra note 30, at n.34.
118. See Faragher III, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2290 (1998) (indicating that "it makes sense" to hold
employers vicariously liable for a supervisor's tortious actions, made possible by abuse of authority,
and Restatement section 219 is an appropriate starting point). The Restatement provides that a master
is liable for the torts of his servants under the following circumstances:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in
the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was
reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relation.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 219.
119. Vicarious liability is also sometimes termed per se liability or strict liability as well. Oppen-
heimer, supra note 30, at 74. Such liability is imposed without considering the fault of the employer,
who may be blameless but is nonetheless liable. Id. at 88. That is, liability is vicariously imposed on
one party for a wrong committed by another party, most commonly liability on the employer for the
wrong of an employee or agent. Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic
Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 563
(1988).
120. Respondeat superior literally translates from Latin as, "[lIet the superior respond," but the
origins of this doctrine are obscure and disputed. Rochelle Rubin Weber, Note, "Scope of Employ-
ment" Redefined: Holding Employers Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed by Their
Employees, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (1992).
121. Oppenheimer, supra note 30, at 77 (describing theories of agency law principles concerning
liability arising from the employer-employee relationship).
122. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 219 cmt. a (explaining that the conception of the
master's liability appears to be an outgrowth of the idea that the master can control the servant's




foresee the possibility of sexual harassment in the workplace, which
justifies assigning the burden of such conduct to the enterprise as a cost
of doing business.123
Thus, an employer may be liable for an agent's misconduct in the
agent's course of employment even though the employer did not
authorize, participate in, or know of the acts. 124 In fact, the employer
may also be liable for the agent's acts even if the employer expressly
forbade them.125 Because the employer holds the agent out as trust-
worthy and competent, in effect the employer guarantees the agent's
good conduct regarding matters within the scope of the agency.1
26
However, the employer is also liable for an agent's actions outside
the agency scope if the employer adopted those actions for the
employer's own use or benefit.127 In addition, if the employer expressly
authorized the agent's actions, the employer is liable for the agent's
actions outside the scope of the agent's employment. 128 Thus, the
agency principle of respondeat superior rests on a deeply rooted
sentiment that responsibility for injuries cannot be disclaimed by
employers who characteristically perform those activities.1 29 The
123. Faragher 111, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2288 (1998).
124. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 452, at 536-37 (5th ed. 1957).
125. Id. Although sexual harassment would seem to fall outside a supervisor's scope of employ-
ment, respondeat superior focuses on the authority to supervise, not the authority to harass. Oppen-
heimer, supra note 30, at 82.
126. STORY, supra note 124, § 452; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 228 (providing that
generally an employee's conduct is within the scope of employment if it is the type of conduct the
employee is employed to perform and if the conduct substantially conforms to the authorized time and
space limits of the work assignment). But cf. Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 348
(Alaska 1990) (concluding that a pastoral counselor's sexual relationship with a patient was within the
scope of employment because this unauthorized harassment arose from and was reasonably incidental
to legitimate work activities); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329
N.W.2d 306, 308, 310 (Minn. 1983) (considering an employee psychologist's intentional sexual
overtures as within the scope of employment, regardless of whether the acts were performed with a
motivation to serve the employer); Nelson v. Gillette, 571 N.W.2d 332, 337 (N.D. 1997) (declining to
constrict the definition of scope of employment, when a social worker sexually abused a client during
business hours and at business-related locations, so that the victim would have a remedy at the very
moment it is most needed).
127. STORY, supra note 124, § 456; see also FLOYD R. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY
§ 732, at 562 (4th ed. 1952) (attributing responsibility to the employer for an agent's acts which result
in injuries to third persons).
128. STORY, supra note 124, § 456.
129. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968). Employers
are almost always properly subject to vicarious liability under respondeat superior, which recognizes
the supervisor's effect on the workplace. Oppenheimer, supra note 30, at 76. Because of the close
connection between the power that supervisors exercise and the work environment itself, the
supervisor's acts of sexual harassment can almost never be independent of the supervisor's authority
as an agent of the employer. Id. From a policy perspective, holding employers responsible for their
employees' wrongful acts allocates risks efficiently, because employers can consider their liability as
a necessary cost of business and ensure that injured employees are compensated. Id. at 78.
Moreover, the employer is the party best able to control the work environment, thus placing the burden
for corrective action on the employer will deter improper employee actions. Id. at 77-78. Accord
White, supra note 31, at 561-62 (concluding that employers are in the best position to foot the bill for
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employer has a greater opportunity to guard against supervisors'
conduct and thus has an incentive to screen, train, and monitor their
performance. 130
2. Role of the Supervisor
Corporate or government entities necessarily must act through their
agents.131 For purposes of Title VII, a supervisor who is given plenary
authority by an employer acts as the employer's agent.132 Therefore,
when an employer invests a supervisor with the power to alter the work-
place, that supervisor effectively is the employer. 133 Supervisors act as
the eyes, ears, and voice of the employer.134 In other words, the delib-
erate act of someone at the decision-making level in the corporate
hierarchy essentially is the corporation's deliberate act.1 35 From an
employee's perspective, the employer and supervisor merge into a single
entity.136  Furthermore, the level of trust and authority delegated to
supervisors allows them access to other employees precisely because of
the agency relationship. 13 7  Thus, the supervisor is aided by the agency
relationship in performing wrongful acts on the employee.138
In determining whether a person acts in an agency or supervisory
capacity, a court must examine the job functions performed by the
individual and the circumstances of the particular employment relation-
ship.139 Relevant circumstances include the supervisor's direct authority
over the employee, the overall structure of the workplace, and the relative
supervisor sexual harassment, so imposing personal liability on those supervisors would not be an
effective deterrent).
130. Faragher III, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2291 (1998). The agency relationship gives a supervisor the
chance to be in contact and sexually harass an employee who may be reluctant to accept the risks of
blowing the whistle. Id. Moreover, a victim cannot simply walk away or tell the supervisor "where to
go." Id.
131. Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir. 1997) (Arnold, J., concurring and
dissenting). Because corporate or government personifications are a legal fiction, these entities
cannot act by themselves and can only effectuate their purposes through their agents. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1370-71. Likewise, the corporate entity does not itself have a mental capacity to
learn of its employees' wrongdoings. The employer must rely on its agents to ensure compliance with
the laws in order to avoid liability. Id. at 1371.
134. Oppenheimer, supra note 30, at 80. Supervisors give instructions and interpret regulations
for employees, evaluate and report on employee performance, and generally influence or determine
the employee's work environment. Id.
135. Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Shager v.
Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (characterizing as a "cat's paw" the corporate
committee that serves as a conduit of a supervisor's prejudice to terminate an employee, thus exposing
the company to liability despite the innocence of committee members).
136. Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Faragher
11I, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2285 (1998) (describing supervisors' decisions as those of the employer).
137. Oppenheimer, supra note 30, at 89.
138. Id. The agency relationship enables a harassing supervisor to call and retain an employee
into the supervisor's presence even over objections, to place the employee in a compromising position,
and to encroach on the employee's personal privacy to a large extent. Id.
139. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(c) (1998).
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positions of the supervisor and employee.140 If a supervisor exercises
significant control over an employee's terms and conditions of employ-
ment, the supervisor acts as the alter ego of the employer.141 In such
instances, the employer is strictly liable for the supervisor's unlawful
employment practices whether or not the employer knew of the
supervisor's conduct.142
However, a supervisor need not have plenary authority to hire, fire,
or promote to be considered an agent whose conduct is binding on an
employer. 4 3 Nor does the supervisor need to have a position of high
authority in the business structure in order to hold the employer liable
under agency principles.' 4 4 In fact, a supervisor who has limited author-
ity and is merely in the business's intermediate structure can serve as an
agent for Title VII purposes.1 45 Requiring supervisors to have signifi-
cant control over the employee, taken to an extreme, would have the
illogical result of shielding employers from liability for the sexual
harassment of low-level supervisors.146
In quid pro quo sexual harassment cases, the supervisor's liability is
vicariously imputed to the employer where sexual favors are directly
linked to the denial or grant of a tangible employment benefit.' 4 7 By
definition, the supervisor acts as the company when conditioning sexual
favors as quid pro quo for job benefits.148 Thus, because the quid pro
quo harasser wields the employer's authority to alter the employee's
terms and conditions of employment, the law imposes strict liability on
the employer.14 9
In Meritor Savings Bank, however, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the possibility that employers are automatically liable for a
140. Vance v. Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1515 (1 1th Cir. 1989). Thus,
whether a person is in a position to be considered an agent for Title VII purposes is an issue for the
factfinder. Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766 F. Supp. 1052, 1069 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
141. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993). An agent or supervisor's
high rank in the organization makes that individual an employer's alter ego. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct.
2257, 2267 (1998). That is, if a harasser is at a sufficiently high level, or if the employer ratifies the
supervisor's acts, the harassment becomes that of the employer. Id.
142. Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1125; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(c) (1998).
143. Sims, 766 F. Supp. at 1069.
144. Id.
145. Vance, 863 F.2d at 1515.
146. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1447-48 (10th Cir. 1997). "This was not the
result intended by Title VII [or] Meritor." Id. But see Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780
(2d Cir. 1994) (rendering situations where low-level supervisors do not rely on their supervisory
authority indistinguishable from co-worker harassment).
147. Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1367 (8th Cir. 1997).
148. Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11 th Cir. 1989).
149. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 777. In fact, every court of appeals has automatically imputed to the
employer supervisory sexual harassment resulting in tangible detriment to the subordinate employee.
Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by
Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens).
1999) 105
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supervisor's hostile work environment sexual harassment.1 5 0
Nevertheless, the Court cautioned that an employer is not necessarily
insulated by lack of notice of a supervisor's actions and the existence of
complaint procedures. 151 Thus, the lower courts faced the challenge of
determining what middle ground remained in agency law to impose
employer liability for a supervisor's discriminatory practices.152 Hostile
work environment sexual harassment was held to a negligence
standard. 153  That is, employers were. directly liable154 if they knew or
should have known about supervisor harassment and failed to take
prompt remedial action against the supervisor.155
To summarize, courts generally have applied vicarious liability for
quid pro quo sexual harassment and a negligence standard, or direct
liability, for hostile work environment claims. 156 However, some courts
also treated threats of tangible employment actions, as well as actual
consequences, as sufficient to justify a quid pro quo claim.157 And so
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this nag-
150. MeritorSav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72.
151. Id. at 72-73. But see Oppenheimer, supra note 30, at 74 (noting the confusion caused by
the Meritor Court when it simultaneously rejected basic agency law theory of imposing vicarious
liability for hostile work environment harassment while requesting the courts to look to agency
principles for guidance). The Meritor Court adopted this position based on the Solicitor General's
brief. Id. at 75. This amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the EEOC at the urging of Clarence
Thomas who was its chairman at the time. Id. Thus, the EEOC added to the confusion by disavowing
its previous stance that endorsed strict liability for all supervisory sexual harassment, both quid pro quo
and hostile work environment. Id.
152. Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir, 1994); see also Karibian, 14 F.3d
at 779 (indicating that the Supreme Court declined to offer further enlightenment on employer liability
beyond these alpha and omega rules).
153. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11 th Cir. 1982).
154. Direct liability under agency principles arises when the master is negligent or reckless in a)
giving improper or ambiguous orders or failing to make proper regulations; b) employing improper
persons or instrumentalities thereby involving risk of harm to others; c) supervising activities; d)
permitting negligent conduct on premises or within instrumentalities under the master's control.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 213. In addition, if an employer ratifies an act of harassment by not
disapproving of it, the employer adopts the act as its own. Id. § 82. Thus, employers are directly liable
for harm caused by breach of their duty. Id. Specific to sexual harassment, agency law imposes
direct liability when an employer acts unreasonably by a) failing to instruct employees to refrain from
sexual harassment; b) failing to adopt policies to prevent the harassment; c) employing people known
to have harassed other employees; d) failing to properly supervise employees to prevent harassment;
e) standing by and doing nothing when harassment occurs; and f) failing to prevent the harassment.
Oppenheimer, supra note 30, at 98.
155. Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1995).
156. Id.; see also Oppenheimer, supra note 30, at 71 (criticizing the courts for failing to impose a
uniform standard of vicarious liability on employers for supervisor sexual harassment). Professor
Oppenheimer blamed the federal courts for incorrectly applying agency rules, thus creating a
quagmire and leaving an important area of law unclear and unpredictable. Id. at 76.
157. Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1994). But see Scalia, supra note 37,
at 325 (advocating that "quid pro quo should be excised, with Occam's razor. And the manner in
which it gained a life of its own stands warning against mechanical reliance on complex tests").
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ging question which had slowly percolated,1 58 regarding the proper
employer liability standards for supervisor sexual harassment.159
III. CASE ANALYSIS
Delivering the majority opinion in Ellerth IV, Justice Kennedy set
out the issue as whether an employer may be held liable, without being
negligent or otherwise at fault, for a supervisor's unwelcome and threat-
ening sexual advances toward an employee who suffers no adverse
tangible employment consequences. 160 The Court premised its analysis
and conclusions on an important proposition, a factual conclusion as yet
unestablished.161 Specifically, the Court assumed that a trier of fact
could find, in the supervisor's remarks, numerous unfulfilled threats to
take adverse tangible employment action against the employee if she
denied sexual favors to the supervisor.162
A. QUID PRO Quo AND HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT:
THRESHOLD QUESTIONS
The Court began its analysis by defining the two categories of
sexual harassment claims, quid pro quo and hostile work environment.
163
The Court then noted the limited utility of these terms for determining
which standard of employer liability applies. 164
The Court indicated that the terms are now relevant only as a
threshold question regarding an employee's ability to prove discrimi-
nation. 165 An employee proves a quid pro quo claim by showing that a
tangible employment action resulted from refusing to submit to a
supervisor's sexual demands. 166 In this situation, the employee has an
actionable claim because the employment decision itself represents an
alteration of the terms or conditions of employment based on sex, which
is prohibited discrimination under Title VII.167
158. Ellerth III, 123 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997) (suggesting the United States Supreme Court
should bring order to the chaotic case law in the important field of supervisor sexual harassment).
159. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2264 (1998).
160. Id. at 2262. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer
joined Justice Kennedy's majority opinion. Id. at 2261. Justice Ginsburg concurred in judgment. Id. at
2271. Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Scalia. Id.
161. Id. at 2264.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.; see also Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766 F. Supp. 1052, 1074 (M.D. Ala.
1990) (refusing to pigeonhole claims of quid pro quo or hostile work environment sexual harassment
by different liability standards).
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Further, an employee proves a hostile work environment claim by
showing severe or pervasive behavior based on sex. 168 The Court
clarified that such behavior includes a supervisor's unfulfilled threats to
change an employee's terms or conditions of employment.169 However,
after the threshold question of proof is resolved, then the standard of
employer liability is derived from agency principles.170
B. AGENCY PRINCIPLES: FORMULATING EMPLOYER LIABILITY
STANDARDS
Noting that Congress explicitly directed the judiciary to interpret
Title VII claims according to agency principles, the Court looked to the
Restatement (Second) of Agency.17 1 In light of this congressional
mandate, the Court cited the need for a uniform and predictable federal,
rather than state, standard of employer liability. 172 Indeed, state court
decisions regarding state employment discrimination law rely on federal
court decisions interpreting Title VII.173
Then the Court proceeded to dissect the Restatement, starting with
the central principle of agency law: "A master is subject to liability for
the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment." 1 74 Thus, an employer may be liable for employees'
intentional and negligent torts if committed within the scope of the
employees' employment. 175 , To be considered within the scope of em-
ployment, generally actions must be performed by an employee who has
a purpose of serving the employer. 176 However, supervisor sexual
168. Id.
169. Id.; see also Ellerth III, 123 F.3d 490, 514 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J., concurring and
dissenting, joined by Manion, J.) (drawing a distinction between a supervisor's deliberate act, which
can reasonably be termed a company act, while the mere threat of such act is not a company act);
Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1393, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (cautioning that more than saber rattling
alone is required to impose quid pro quo liability for supervisors who alternately promise and then
threaten employment consequences as carrot-and-stick tactics without follow-through).
170. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2265.
171. Id. at 2266; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 16 and discussion supra Section 1iB; Meritor
Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (agreeing with the EEOC that Congress wanted
agency principles to guide courts in the area of sexual harassment); Brief for the United States and the
EEOC as Amici Curiae at 22, Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979)
(contending that Congress forewarned courts that formulated employer liabilitystandards should draw
from traditional agency principles).
172. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2265. The Court characterized this federal standard not as a judicial
creation, but rather, as a judicial interpretation of the general common law of agency in accord with
legislative intent. Id. The dissent by Justices Thomas and Scalia begged to differ, labeling the
majority's federal standard a "whole-cloth creation." Id. at 2273.
173. Id. at 2265-66.
174. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 219(1).
175. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2266.
176. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §§ 228(l)(c), 230 (classifying conduct as within
the scope of employment, even if forbidden by the employer, when at least partly actuated by a
purpose of serving the employer); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
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harassment rarely serves an employer's purpose 77 and, thus, usually is
not within the scope of employment.178
Nevertheless, agency principles impose employer liability for em-
ployee torts committed outside the scope of employment as well.179
Employers may be held liable if they intended the conduct or conse-
quences, were negligent or reckless, or had a nondelegable duty.180
Further, employers may be held liable if a supervisor purported to act
on behalf of the employer, and this apparent authority was relied upon,
or if the supervisor was aided in committing the tort by the agency
relationship. 181
But the Court did not find employer liability based on the
employer's own intentional, negligent, or reckless conduct.182 Bur-
lington was neither directly liable, because the company had no intention
of sexually harassing Ellerth, nor indirectly liable because supervisor
Slowik was not high enough in rank to be considered Burlington's alter
ego. 183 Furthermore, Ellerth had requested the Court to impose strict
TORTS § 70, at 505-06 (5th ed. 1984) (terming tortious conduct, such as a salesperson lying to a
customer to make a sale, as within scope of employment because the employer is benefited by the
additional sale, despite violating the employer's policies).
177. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2266 (reasoning that an employer's purpose is seldom served by a
supervisor who acts for personal motives of sexual desire or gender-based animus). But see supra
note 125 (discussing cases of unauthorized sexual harassment determined to be within the scope of
employment).
178. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2266. The Faragher III Court came to this same conclusion, that
generally supervisor sexual harassment is not within the scope of employment, but on different
grounds. 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2288 (1998). The Court recognized not only that sexual harassment is a
reasonably foreseeable workplace problem, but also that a supervisor's scope of authority and
responsibility includes maintaining a safe and productive work environment. Id. Thus, an employer
may be fairly charged for a supervisor's unlawful sexual harassment as a cost of doing business. Id.
However, the Court concluded that supervisor harassment is more appropriately evaluated as outside
the scope of employment, in order to distinguish peer from supervisor harassment. Id. at 2289-90.
179. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 219(2) cmt. e (enumerating situations of employer liability
for employees who act from personal motives and thus fall outside the scope of employment); see also
2 L. JAYSON & R. L ONGSTREm, H ANDuNG FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 9.07[4], at 9-211 (1998) (limiting
employer liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994 & West Supp. 1999),
when supervisors act from personal motives, which are deemed outside the scope of employment).
180. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 219(2)(a)-(c). A nondelegable duty arises from a special
relationship requiring a heightened duty of care that remains the absolute responsibility of the principal
party. Id. § 214 cmt. a. Thus, a nondelegable duty is an affirmative and nontransferable obligation to
ensure the protection of the party to whom the duty runs. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 396 (1982).
181. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 219(2)(d).
182. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2267.
183. Id. But see Faragher III, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2284 (1998) (illustrating a high echelon harasser
who acts as the alter ego of the employer from the Court's previous decision in Harris); cf. Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993) (describing sexual harassment of an employee by the
company president). However, none of the harassing supervisors in either Ellerth IV or Faragher III
was at a high enough level to be treated as the organization's proxy. Ellerth/ IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2267;
Faragher Il, 118 S. Ct. at 2284. The Court indicated that such positions as proprietors, partners, and
corporate officers are of sufficient rank in the hierarchy to impose automatic liability. Faragher III,
118 S. Ct. at 2284; see also Weiss, supra note 60, at 300 (voicing the open question: "[Hiow high is
high echelon?"). Professor Weiss stated that it is unclear exactly how far down the corporate ladder
executives can be to still be considered as proxies or alter egos of the organization. Id. at 293-94.
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liability, not a negligence standard.184 The Court also dismissed the
possibility of holding Burlington liable for sexual harassment because of
a nondelegable duty.185
Finally, the Court examined the apparent authority standard and
aided in the agency relation standard of employer liability for employee
conduct outside the scope of employment.186 Apparent authority is
relevant when the supervisor purports to use a power not actually held,
rather than misusing or threatening to misuse actual power. 187 Thus, the
Court also found this standard inappropriate because Slowik had actual
supervisory authority, not apparent authority.188 However, the Court
found that under the agency relationship standard, it was appropriate to
impose vicarious liability on an employer for supervisor sexual harass-
ment, with a caveat: the requirement of "something more." 189
The existence of "something more" is beyond dispute when a
supervisor inflicts an adverse tangible employment action on an
employee. 190 Without the aid of the agency relationship, the supervisor
would be unable to make significant changes in a subordinate's employ-
ment status such as termination, nonpromotion, undesirable reassign-
ment, or reduction in benefits.191 However, "something more" is less
obvious when supervisor sexual harassment does not culminate in a
tangible job consequence.1 92 For example, a supervisor's sexual harass-
ment always conveys a threatening character because of delegated power
over subordinates, and so the supervisor is always aided by the agency
relationship.193 On the other hand, some acts of supervisor harassment
could also be committed by a co-worker, so the supervisor's status
makes little difference. 194 Therefore, tension is created between the two
184. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2267.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2267.
187. Id. at 2267-68.
188. Id. at 2268.
189. Id. The Court reasoned that most tortfeasors in the work environment are aided by their
agency relationship with the employer due to proximity and regular contact with a captive pool of
potential victims. Id. Without "something more," the employer would be vicariously liable for
co-worker harassment as well, an extension the Court was unwilling to pursue. Id.
190. Id. However, the Court did not address situations in which supervisors coerce employees
into submitting to unwelcome sexual relationships. Kahan, supra note 28, at 763. Because the
employee submits, in order to receive an employment benefit, the employee will be unable to
demonstrate any tangible job detriment. Id. Therefore, the question remains whether submission
claims will still be cognizable as quid pro quo sexual harassment, the threshold determining whether an
employer may raise the affirmative defense. Id.
191. EllerthIV, 118S. Ct. at 2268-69.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.; see also Ellerth III, 123 F.3d 490, 512 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J., concurring and
dissenting, joined by Manion, J.) (asserting that without a tangible employment act, a supervisor's
modes of harassment are equally available to co-workers; yet confirming that a victimized employee
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possibilities presented by the malleable terminology of the aided in the
agency relation standard.195 The standard may be read either to expand
or to limit employer liability.196
Moreover, the Court gave weight to the fact that Congress had not
changed Meritor's ruling in any subsequent amendments to Title VII. 197
The Meritor Court interpreted agency principles as refraining from
applying vicarious liability to employers for supervisor 98 sexual harass-
ment creating a hostile work environment. 199 Nevertheless, now the
Ellerth IV Court held that an employer is vicariously liable when a
supervisor either takes a tangible employment action or creates a hostile
work environment.2 00
C. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: REACHING A COMPROMISE
Despite holding employers liable without being negligent or other-
wise at fault, the Court extended an olive branch: if the supervisor has
not taken any tangible employment action against the subordinate, the
employer may raise an affirmative defense. 20 The employer must prove
two necessary elements for this defense: 1) the employer has exercised
reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the supervisor sexual
harassment; and 2) the employee has unreasonably failed to take advan-
tage of the employer's preventive or corrective opportunities. 202 The
is bound to be constantly aware of a supervisor's authority).
195. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2270; see also Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
198. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. The Court defined a supervisor as an individual who has
immediate or higher-level authority over the harassed employee. Id. But see Weiss, supra note 60, at
299 (stating that the Court failed to raise the issue of management or supervisory harassers outside of
the hierarchical chain of direct authority over a victim). Professor Weiss described the sharp
boundary line between supervisors and others as really more of a continuum, and she predicted that
"these chickens will come home to roost" in later problems regarding the omitted classifications. Id. at
307-08. For example, collateral supervisors outside the direct line of authority may trade favors with
each other to punish harassment targets. Id. at 308.
199. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72.
200. Id. The Court's holding also applies to Faragher III, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). Justices
Marshall and Brennan must be smiling from the grave because they argued for vicarious liability for
hostile work environment supervisory harassment 12 years earlier in their concurrence to the Meritor
decision. Id. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens).
Justice Marshall supported this stricter standard of liability because a supervisor is charged not only
with the power to hire, fire, or discipline employees but also with ensuring a safe, productive work-
place. Id. at 76. Reasoning that both abuses of power should have the same consequence, Justice
Marshall indicated that it is precisely because a supervisor is clothed with the employer's authority that
the supervisor is able to impose unwelcome sexual advances on subordinates. Id. at 76-77.
201. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. The lack of a detrimental job consequence gives employer
defendants an opportunity to prove by a preponderance the affirmative defense. Id. Or, as Justice
O'Connor so aptly stated, "the employer may convince the fact finder that despite the smoke, there is
no fire." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 266 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
202. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. However, the Court cautioned that employer proof of promul-
gating an anti-harassment policy is not necessary in every instance, nor is proof the employee failed to
avoid harm limited only to unreasonable failure to take advantage of the grievance procedure. Id.
Justice Thomas's dissent criticized this hedging by the Court, as "issu[ing] only Delphic pronounce
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affirmative defense limits employer liability by encouraging employers
to develop and implement policies and grievance procedures to combat
sexual harassment.2 03 Additionally, employers must reasonably respond
to a course of harassing conduct by taking measures to stop the harass-
ment and to prevent recurrence.2 04 Based on the avoidable consequenc-
es doctrine of tort law, the employee is also encouraged to report super-
visor sexual harassment before it becomes severe or pervasive. 205
D. THE DISSENT
Justice Thomas, writing for the dissent,206 charged the majority with
willfully "manufacturing" the rule holding employers vicariously liable
for supervisors who create a hostile work environment based on sex.
207
The dissent voiced particular concern that employers will now be held to
different standards of liability for hostile work environment claims,
depending on whether the basis is sex or race.2 08 Challenging the
majority's affirmative defense as a poorly defined "divination of Title
VII's gestalt," Justice Thomas warned of a "continuing reign of confu-
sion" in sexual harassment litigation.2 09 Amidst predictions of an
avalanche of litigation to clarify the "myster[ious]" and "vague"
affirmative defense, Justice Thomas spoke of the mind-boggling para-
dox that the majority claimed to follow legislative intent behind Title
VII, promoting conciliation rather than litigation. 210
ments and leav[ing] the dirty work to the lower courts." Id. at 2274.
203. Id. at 2270. The Court indicated that the goal of both Congress and the EEOC is deterrence.
Id.
204. Weiss, supra note 60, at 309. Professor Weiss places an employer at high risk by knowingly
leaving a harassing supervisor in place. Id. Strong oversight and preferably retraining or discipline
may ensure against repeat harassment, but in some cases the only reasonable option may be to fire the
supervisor. Id. But see, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F. 2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991) (ruling that an
effective remedy is one reasonably calculated to end the harassment and is assessed proportionately to
the seriousness of the conduct); Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 536 (7th Cir. 1993)
(determining that the employer effectively responded to a complaint of sexual harassment by
conducting a prompt, although inconclusive, investigation and by allowing the victim to work at home
until the harasser was transferred); Waymire v. Harris County Tex., 86 F.3d 424, 429 (5th Cir. 1996)
(reprimanding the harasser was appropriate and sufficient to avoid employer liability because the
harassment stopped following this remedial action).
205. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; see also C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES 127 (1935)
(summarizing the general rule of avoidable consequences as follows: "Where one person has
committed a tort ...against another, it is incumbent upon the latter to use such means as are
reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages. The person wronged cannot
recover for any item of damage which could thus have been avoided."); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1427-28 (7th Cir. 1986) (penalizing a discharged victim of harassment for
failing to mitigate the harm, under the doctrine of avoidable consequences: "You cannot just leave the
labor force after being wrongfully discharged, in the hope of someday being made whole by a
judgment at law").
206. Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion. EllerthIV, 118 S. Ct. at 2271.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2273.




Sexual harassment has proven to be a hot topic,2 11 with the United
States Supreme Court granting certiorari to three Title VII cases on the
issue during the 1998 term alone. 212 The Court's holdings have had an
immediate impact on racial discrimination in the workplace. However, it
remains to be seen whether the Court's attempt to provide clear guide-
lines will stem the surging tide of sexual harassment litigation.
A. VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR RACIALLY HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
The spillover to race-based harassment from the Court's decision in
Ellerth IV did not take long.2 13 Relying on Ellerth IV, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reinstated a black transit worker's
claim that her supervisor created a racially hostile work environment. 214
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that sexual harassment principles apply with
equal force to racial harassment for three reasons: 1) a preference for
harmonizing these employer liability standards;2 15 2) similar situations
presented by both racial and sexual harassment; and 3) the Ellerth IV
Court interpreted the same Title VII language which is relevant to
employer liability in race discrimination. 216 According to the court, a
reasonable jury could find vicarious liability if it decides that the
supervisor had sufficient control over the employee to be considered her
supervisor and if the employee could not have avoided the harm.2 17
Therefore, concerns regarding some dangers of analogizing race
and sex may be allayed by the decision in Ellerth IV.218 Borrowing
211. Monica E. McFadden, But is it Harassment? TRIAL, Dec. 1998, at 48.
212. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2260; Faragher III, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2282 (1998) (concerning the
extent of employer liability for supervisor sexual harassment); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (concerning same-sex harassment); see also Weiss, supra note 60, at 261
(commenting that the Court's concentration in a single term on such a narrow, albeit highly important,
issue is unusual). Professor Weiss noted that Title VII is already a mature statute, under which sexual
harassment claims have been recognized since the mid-1970s. Id. at 263. Moreover, despite the
persistence of the sexual harassment problem in the workplace, "it would be unfair to characterize em-
ployers as resisting compliance." Id. Rather, Professor Weiss suggested that employers may be hav-
ing difficulty refining their anti-harassment policies so as to effectuate compliance with Title VI. Id.
213. See Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2272-73 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Scalia) (ruing
the Court's differential employer liability for hostile work environment discrimination based on sex
and race, Justice Thomas suggested restoring parallel treatment under a uniform negligence standard).
However, the standard is swinging in the opposite direction, imposing vicarious liability for both sexual
and racial hostile work environment claims. See Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d
1264 (10th Cir. 1998).
214. Wright-Simmons, 155 F.3d at 1270.
215. See Faragher III, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 n.l (1998).
216. Wright-Simmons, 155 F.3d at 1270.
217. Id. at 1271.
218. See Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; see also L. Camille Hebert, Analogizing Race and Sex in
Workplace Harassment Claims, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 819, 878 (1977).
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from the standards of proof in sexual harassment claims, courts had
made the burden of establishing racial harassment more difficult.219
Thus, the danger arose that importing gender-neutral perspectives to all
discrimination claims would dilute the relevance of racial minorities'
experiences with racially threatening and offensive behavior. 220
However, the Ellerth IV Court's imposition of vicarious liability on
employers, regardless of fault, now has enabled the courts to get equally
tough with racial harassment. 221
B. DETERRENCE OR OPENED LITIGATION FLOODGATES
The dissent by Justice Thomas forecast that, in practice, employer
liability may very well become the rule. 222 The dissent suggested that
litigation will not be curbed but, rather, will simply shift to proving the
two-pronged affirmative defense. 223 Justice Thomas criticized the
majority for providing "shockingly little guidance" to employers who
wish to avoid liability and for leaving the "dirty work" to the lower
courts.
2 2 4
219. Hebert, supra note 218, at 878. For example, the sexual harassment requirement of unwel-
comeness makes relevant an inquiry into whether the target of racial harassment somehow invited that
behavior. Id.
220. Id. Specifically, due to the requirement that sexual harassment conduct must be severe or
pervasive, even serious racially motivated statements regarding lynching or assault were determined
insufficient for an actionable racial harassment claim. Id.
221. See Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; see also Wright-Simmons, 155 F.3d at 1270; Deffenbaugh-
Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying vicarious liability to employ-
ers for racially discriminating against an employee terminated because of her relationship with a black
man); Owens v. Commercial Testing & Eng'r Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18147, at **28-29 (S.D. Ala.
1998) (following the reasoning in Ellerth IV as to the substantive merits of a racially hostile work
environment claim). Moreover, race-based harassment claims brought under § 1981 have no statutory
ceiling on punitive damage awards. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
222. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2274 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Scalia). See, e.g.,
Landmark Eveleth 16 Suit is Heading Back to Court (visited Nov. 30, 1998) <http://www.pioneer
planet.com> (reporting that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reopened "the
seminal sexual harassment case in the U.S," Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847 (D.
Minn. 1993)). The EEOC stated this class action lawsuit opened the door for others, including the $34
million settlement between Mitsubishi Corp. and 350 women employees in Illinois. Id. Nevertheless,
in the Eveleth mine case, the federal magistrate responsible for determining how much 15 years of
pain and suffering was worth, labeled the women histrionic, paranoid, or puritanical. Id. The
magistrate then awarded a mere $11,000 per victim. Id. Subsequently, the appellate court issued an
unusually harsh rebuttal castigating the magistrate's decision and ordering a trial. Id. Experts predict
a historic settlement or judgment. Id. A local employment attorney said, "I hear the cash registers
ringing very loudly." Id. Just before the jury was to consider damages, Eveleth settled for an
undisclosed amount. Amy Radii, Minnesota Public Radio (visited Jan. 1, 1999) <http://www.npr.org>.
223. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2273-74 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Scalia); see also
Weiss, supra note 60, at 315 (surmising that Justice Thomas is surely correct in his predictions that the
litigation will now focus to elaborating on the affirmative defense).
224. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2274 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Scalia); see, e.g.,
Stephens v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 162 F.3d 1013, 1014 (8th Cir. 1998) (reversing summary judgment and
remanding to allow the plaintiff to prove a hostile work environment claim, thus entitling her employer
to present an affirmative defense); Newton v. Cadwell Lab., 156 F.3d 880, 884 (8th Cir. 1998) (revers-
ing summary judgment on a sexual harassment claim because the lack of a detrimental employment
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However, employers can be masters of their own fate by taking
action to minimize their liability through policy statements and effective
grievance procedures. 225 In order to avoid liability, employers face an
increased burden of educating and sensitizing their employees. 226
Employers should also take prevention a step further by developing
organized, formal, and comprehensive programs.2 27  In fact, some
employers are instituting zero-tolerance policies. 228 Care must be taken
to allow a safe avenue of complaint for victims of sexual harassment, as
well as effective dissemination of the policy.2 29 Employers must not
consider sexual harassment policy or procedures as a game to be played
but not taken seriously. 230
action no longer controls the issue of vicarious liability after Ellerth IV).
225. Daniel L. Hovland, Sexual Harassment: What Employers Need to Know, GAVEL, Dec.
1996-Jan. 1997, at 8; see also Ellerth III, 123 F.3d 490, 513 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J., concurring and
dissenting, joined by Judge Manion) (stating courts are "at sea" in designing optimum systems to rein in
supervisors' discretion in exercising their delegated authority, so this responsibility should be entirely
shifted to the employer).
226. Hovland, supra note 225, at 7.
227. Id. at 8. Attorney Hovland recommends advising employer clients to take the initiative by a)
conducting an informal survey of employees to determine if there is a sexual harassment problem in
the workplace, perhaps including an audit of the premises to remove insensitive materials; b)
establishing the support of top management by briefing and educating supervisors on the costs and
consequences of sexual harassment; c) adopting and publishing an express written policy against
sexual harassment, revised periodically and clearly demonstrating the employer's understanding and
commitment to zero-tolerance (the policy should contain a purpose, definitions of sexual harassment,
outline steps for victims and management to follow if sexual harassment is perceived, and list possible
disciplinary actions); d) establishing a flexible complaint procedure which offers more than one
channel of action, such as designating individuals to contact who are "credible, objective, impartial,
and sensitive to the problem"; e) investigating complaints properly by carefully documenting all efforts
taken to discipline harassers; f) being sensitive and serious about the sexual harassment so that victims
or harassers cannot construe the policy as a sham; and g) training all levels of employees to gain a
better understanding and early recognition of signals of sexual harassment. Id. at 8-9.
228. Cloud, supra, note 106, at 49 (reporting on zero-tolerance policies of large employers, such
as General Motors and Wal-Mart, which even forbid "sending e-mail with a naughty Web address to
a co-worker"). Compare Ellerth 111, 123 F.3d at 511, 513 (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting,
joined by Judge Manion) (suggesting the unfeasibility of large employers' ability to stamp out
harassment by monitoring thousands of supervisors, without extreme expense and great curtailment of
employee privacy by such means as continuous surveillance, periodic lie-detector tests, or company
spies trailing employees on business trips) with id. at 569 (Wood, J., concurring and dissenting, joined
by Judges Easterbrook and Rovner) (assuring that employers are quite capable of monitoring
supervisors "without engaging in Orwellian surveillance").
229. Faragher III, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998) (denying remand for consideration of a possible
affirmative defense of the employer which failed to disseminate its harassment policy and failed to
bypass harassing supervisors when victims registered complaints).
230. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981), In Bundy, when the employee
brought complaints of her supervisor's harassment to the attention of a high-level manager, he
responded, "[A]ny man in his right mind would want to rape you." Id. at 940; see also Hunter v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1420 (7th Cir. 1986) (chastising supervisors for failing "to take
more than half-hearted measures to stop the harassment"); Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766
F. Supp. 1052, 1072 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (criticizing higher-ups for setting the stage by creating an
environment in which all male police officers felt free to sexually harass at their pleasure); Weiss,
supra note 60, at 310 (informing that a real and meaningful investigation is essential, to avoid
employees' perceptions that the employer is just "going through the motions" or that the procedure
would be futile or, worse, counterproductive).
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Conversely, victimized employees are also required by the presence
of the employer's affirmative defense not to sit back and aggregate
incidents of harassment. 231 Unfortunately, victims may be reluctant to
come forward with a complaint because of the effects of systematic
oppression. 232 However, in Ellerth IV, the Court provided an incentive
for employees to be forthcoming in order to recover.233
V. CONCLUSION
In Ellerth IV, the holding of the United States Supreme Court sent a
clarion call to employers that sexual harassment must be eradicated from
the workplace. 234  Imposing vicarious liability, without negligence or
fault, challenges employers to set a tone of respect in the working
environment. 235 Yet, the affirmative defense fairly balances responsibili-
ty between employer and employee to take immediate steps to confront,
prevent, and remove barriers to sexual equality in employment. 236
Noel Evans
231. Ellerth 111, 123 F.3d at 523 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1313 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (describing an employee
keeping detailed notes of her supervisor's offensive comments for months before reporting the
harassment to the employer).
232. Ellerth 1, 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1123 (N.D. Il1. 1996).
233. Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998); see also Pamela J. White, Sexual Harassment:
Risky Business in the Law Office, 31 MD. BAR J. 20, 25 (1998) (recommending that employees should
be made aware of their own obligations to tell their employers about problems of workplace sexual
harassment).
234. See Ellerth IV, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
235. See id.
236. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (indicating that Title VII invali-
dates all artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers that operate as "built-in headwinds" to
employment opportunity).
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